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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE DEN\TER .A.XJ) RIO GRANDE ' 
WESTERX RAILROAD 
( 
1():Th:[P ANY, a Corporation, 
Petitioner, 
- vs.-
TIIE STATE TAX CO~IMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case 
No. 9312 
ST .. \TE1fENT OF THE CASE 
The parties herein will be designated in the same 
manner as adopted by petitioner, the Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Co., as the ''Rio Grande,'' and 
respondent, State Tax Commission of Utah, as the ''Tax. 
Commission. ' ' 
The Stat(? Tax Commission of the State of Utah 
has levied an assessment against the Denver and Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Co. for a sales tax on the 
amount charged by Rio Grande for repairs to cars and 
1 
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locomotives of other railroads which are repaired by Rto 
Grande pursuant to ''Rules of the Association of Ameri-
can Railroads.'' The pertinent facts are set forth in a 
stipulation of facts heretofore filed in the above proceed-
ing and are not in dispute. 
Section 59-15-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
''From and after the effective date of this act 
there is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: ... (e) A tax equivalent to 2% of the amount 
paid or charged for all services for repairs or reno-
vations of tangible personal property rendered in 
connection with other tangible personal property.'' 
The present controversy arises out of an attempt by 
the Tax Commission to apply this statute to the amount 
charged by Rio Grande for repairs to cars and locomo-
tives of other railroads. 
The only question raised by this appeal is "~hether or 
not a tax upon these charges constitutes an unlawful bur-
den on interstate commerce. Assuming, ""ithout conced-
ing, the validity of petitioner's argument on pages 8-10 
of its brief, it is submitted that this Court is not obliged 
to construe the issue in the manner advocated by peti-
tioner -the tax was imposed upon the an1ount charged 
for repairs. The validity or application of Tax Commis-
sion Sales Tax Regulation 78 \vas not considered in the 
formal decision of the Tax Commission nor raised at any 
time prior hereto by petitioner. Neither should this reg-
ulation be used to adduce the intention of the Legislature 
in enacting Section 59-15-4. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE SALES TAX IN UTAH IS A TRANSACTION 
TAX. 
PoiNT II 
THE ASSESSMENT OF SALES TAX ON THE 
AMOUNTS CHARGED BY RIO GRANDE FOR 
REPAIRS TO CARS AND LOCOMOTIVES OF 
OTHER RAILROADS IS NOT A BURDEN ON 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE PROHIBITED BY 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
PoiNT III 
THE FACT THAT RIO GRANDE IS PROHIBITED 
BY FEDERAL LAW FROM MOVING DEFECTIVE 
CARS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A TAX UPON 
REP AIRS OF SUCH CARS BE DEEMED AN IL-
LEGAL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE SALES TAX IN UTAH IS A TRANSACTION 
TAX. 
Any analysis of a tax problem must first begin with 
a determination of the kind of tax involved. Clearly, rules 
applicable to the decision of a use tax case may not neces-
sarily apply to a sales tax problem. 
The majority of decided cases in this area involve 
'vhat is hereby denominated as the retail sales tax- the 
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most restricted type - which is imposed only upon saies 
of tangible personal property at retail. However, the sales 
tax has been expanded in Utah to include sales of tan-
gible personal property at retail as well as certain sales 
of services by business enterprises. See 59-15-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. This type of sales 
tax may properly be categorized as a general sales tax. 
However, both of these forms of taxation can and 
should be distinguished from other taxes, the basis of 
'vhich may be an amount charged or paid. In Utah the 
sales tax is not a tax on property but rather a tax upon 
the transaction. The amount of consideration involved 
in the sale or transaction is the measure to which the rate 
is applied. W. F. Jensen C~dy Co. v. State Tax Connn., 
90 Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629 (1936); [Tnion Stock Yards"\:. 
State Tax Commission, 93 Utah 174, 71 P. 2d 542 (1937). 
The use tax is a tax upon the storage, use or con-
sumption of tangible personal property 'vithin the state 
of Utah. Sou,thern Pac. Co. Y. Utah State Tax Connn., 
106 Utah 451, 150 P. 2d 111 (1944). 
A gross receipts tax, although foreign to Utah la"~, 
is a tax upon gross receipts receiYt)d from the total busi-
ness operation of a taxpayer and not upon any particular 
transaction. Such a tax based \\~holly or in part upon re-
ceipts derived from interstate commerce is unconstitu-
tional because it is a direct burden on benefits to be de-
rived from such commerce. Cooley~ Taxatio1~, 4th Ed. 
§ 395. 
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It becomes appart\Ilt that, given a valid basis of di~-
1 i nction, decisioils in ,·olviug gross receipts or use taxes 
cannot be used to resolve the problem in the instant rn:..;e. 
It is submitted that the onl~· possible way in "·hich the 
apparently eonfl ieting decisions in this area can be recon-
<'ile(l is to recognize the type of tax involved and the 
general princi pies governing its application. 
It is contended that the basic principles governing 
the decision of the instant controversy should be the same 
as are applied to the retail sales tax. Whether the article 
sold is intangible service or tangible personal property 
should have no bearing upon the taxability of such a sale 
assuming a valid application of taxing po,vers. 
PorNT II 
THE ASSESSMENT OF SALES TAX ON TI-IE 
AMOUNTS CHARGED BY RIO GRANDE FOR 
REP AIRS TO CARS AND LOCOMOTIVES OF 
OTHER RAILROADS IS NOT A BURDEN ON 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE PROHIBITED BY 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The petitioner contends that the imposition of the 
tax assessed by the Commission is a burden on inter-
state commerce prohibited by the Commerce Clause of 
the Federal Constitution, and cites as authorities for this 
proposition Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Ta:r 
Co1nmission, 110 Ut. 99, 169 P. 2d 804 (1946), and Sottfh-
ern Pacific Co. v. [-rtah ~'itate Counnission, 106 l!t. 451, 
150 P. 2d 110 (1944). 
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The Union Pacific case, supra, involved engines pur-
chased by the taxpayer used by it in switching operations 
and hauling of interstate and intrastate cars in the state 
of Nebraska which were subsequently transferred by it, 
under their own power to Utah. They \\~ere inspected, 
refueled and repaired at the Salt Lake City roundhouse, 
and following this procedure, the engines were placed in 
s·\Yitching services, both interstate and intrastate in Utah. 
The Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of the tax-
payer and found that no taxable moments not involYed 
with interstate commerce existed and, therefore, no tax 
\Vas due. The Court held that the transfer of s\vitching 
engines from Nebraska to Utah was a furtherance of 
interstate commerce and did not establish a withdrawal 
of engines from interstate actiYities during the course of 
their movement so as to subject them to a state use tax 
\Yhen they came to rest in Utah for servicing, inspection 
and overhauling before commencing S\\Titrhing operations 
here. 
The Southern Pacific (Yo. v. [Itah State Tax Cotnnlis-
sion case, supra, "Tas one "There the Commission had 
assessed use tax against the food carried on trains of 
the taxpayer for the purpose of feeding dining car ste\v-
ards and other employees. In that case, the Court held 
that the storage of consumption of said foods \vithin the 
state of Utah was in furtherance of interstate commerce 
and, therefore, taxation of the same \Vas forbidden by the 
Commerce Clause. The food involved \\·as purchased out-
side of the state of Utah. The Court, speaking through 
1\Ir. Justice McDonough, said: 
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''The furnishing in Utah of the prepared meals for 
the ere"~ differs then from an event \vhich takes 
place before transportation in interstate commerce 
of goods in relation to which the event occurs, or 
one which occurs in relation thereto after such 
transportation ceases. The event here sought to be 
taxed is one in furtherance of interstate commerce, 
the consumption of the goods not merely in the 
course of an interstate journey but in interstate 
commerce.'' 
Generally, both cases were given a similar interpre-
tation: the Court held that the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution foreclosed the taxation involved because 
the subject matter of each \Yas in the course of move-
~ 
ment in interstate commerce. Both cases involved the use 
tax. It is respectfully submitted that the instant case 
does not fall \vithin the same category, but rather should 
be treated as a tax imposed upon local business activity 
and applicable to all transactions on the same basis, not 
intending, nor in fact discriminating against interstate 
commerce. 
Several efforts have been made to apply sales and 
use tax to articles used in interstate commerce. In H elson 
and Randolph Y. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279, 
73 L. Ed. 683 (1929), cited by petitioner, the United 
States Supreme Court faced for the first time the valid-
ity of use taxes as applied to articles used in interstate 
commerce. There, l(entucky levied a tax upon all gasoline 
used or sold \vithin the state. The objecting taxpayer was 
a citizen and resident of Illinois where it had its place of 
business. Taxpayer did an exclusively interstate ferry 
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business, and the gasoline used to create the motive power 
of the ferry was purchased outside Kentucky, although 
75 per cent of it was actually consumed within the borders 
of Kentucky. Using familiar doctrinal declarations, the 
Court condemned the use tax as a ''direct burden'' upon 
the "priYilege of using an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce.'' See 279 U. S. at p. 252. 
Other cases to the same effect followed, including 
the []nion Pacific and Southern Pacific cases heretofore 
mentioned and relied upon by petitioner. 
Following the immunity from u~e taxes granted by 
the II elson case and those that followed, an escape from 
sales tax on articles to be used in interstate commerce \vas 
attempted in Eastern Air Transport, Inc. Y. South Caro-
lina 11ax Comm., 285 U. S. 147, 52 S. Ct. 340, 76 L. Ed. 
673 (1932). 
The court refused, ho\vever, to expand the zone of 
tax immunity in this field. Iu the Eastern .L-lir Transport 
case, South Carolina had imposed on all dealers in gaso-
iine a license tax measured by the number of gallons of 
gasoline sold in the state. The complaining taxpayer 
operated planes only in interstate commerce. Purchases 
of gasoline were made in the taxing state for use of its 
I ,lanes, and the seller added the amount of the tax to the 
price which the purchaser had to pay. In refusing an 
injunction against the collection of the tax as an alleged 
violation of the Commerce Clause, the court sustained 
the validity of the tax as applied to the taxpaying 
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,, 
-· 
carrier, although engaged exclusively in interstate com-
merce. It said : 
''Mere purchase of supplies or equipment for use 
in conducting interstate commerce is not so iden-
tified with that commerce as to make the sale im-
mune from a non-discriminatory tax imposed by 
the state upon intrastate dealers.'' 
The court found no difficulty in distinguishing the sales 
tax involved in the Eastern Transport case from the use 
struck down in the Helson case, on the ground that a use 
is ''manifestly different from ... a tax upon purely local 
sales.'' 
A state taxing statute can be invalidated under the 
Commerce Clause only if it subjects interstate commerce 
to such a burden as is tantamount to an interference with 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the 
several states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Whether 
or not it interferes with interstate commerce is a ques-
tion of fact. Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 
290, 42 S. Ct. 305, 66 L. Ed. 622 ( 1921) ; K arnsas City Bell 
Ry. Co. v. Ka;nsas, 240 U. S. 227, 36 S. Ct. 261, 60 L. Ed. 
617 (1915). 
A tax imposed upon a local activity, or imposed on an 
interstate transaction before the interstate movement 
has commenced or after it has come to rest, is valid be-
cause it cannot be imposed in more than one state. Ameri-
can ]Jfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522, 
63 I-1. Ed. 1084 (1919); Western Livestock v. Bureau, 303 
U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 83 L. Ed. 823 (1937); Coverdale 
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v. Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604, 58 S. Ct. 736, 82 L. Ed. 
1043 (1937); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 
52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232 ( 1931). The tax here is upon 
a sale of services rendered, a local event which can take 
place in only a single state. It is imposed not upon the 
seller but upon local buyers, who cannot be taxed in any 
other state. Wiloil v. Penrna:., 294 U. S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358, 
79 L. Ed. 838 (1934) ; Utah Power Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 
165, 52 S. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038 ( 1931). A similar case 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court was that of [Tnion 
Stockyards v. State Tax Con~mission of Utah, 93 Ut. 174, 
71 P. 2d 542 (1937). In that case the plaintiff was a cor-
poration engaged in the business of unloading, feeding, 
watering and reloading livestock intransit in interstate 
commerce as an agent of interstate railroads operating in 
and through Ogden. A primary duty of feeding and rest-
ing livestock was with the shipper, bu~rier was 
subject to penalty if it failed to furnish proper facilities 
and opportunity for the unloading, feeding and resting of 
the animals so moving in interstate commerce. The State 
Tax Commission levied against a plaintiff a tax on the 
value of the hay, grain and stra"'" furnished by plaintiff 
to livestock under such contracts. The tax leried included 
a, small amount assessed for the furnishing of hay, graiu 
GJnd stra1t to licestock moving in interstate co1n 1nerce. 
(Emphasis supplied) It was therein stated: 
"It may be conceded 'Yithout discussion that the 
livestock in question 'Yere intransit in interstate 
commerce and that the carriers provided for the 
feeding of such livestock by plaintiff pursuant to 
the federal statutes. The tax cailllot be dismissed 
because the fped sold is consumed by animals in 
10 
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the course of shipment in interstate commerce. 
The incidence of the tax is before the interstate 
commerce bega;n, as applied to the articles taxed. 
The Utah sales tax is a tax on the transaction. 
(Citing eases.) Here the hay, grain, and stra'v did 
not become a part of interstate commerce until 
after it had been fed to the livestock. The situation 
is analogous to that in the case of Nashville, C. & 
St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 
77 L. Ed. 730, 87 ALR 1191, where gasoline pur-
chased by the carrier outside of the state of Ten-
nessee was brought into that state in tank cars, 
unloaded and placed in carrier's own storage 
tanks. It was withdrawn and used by the carrier 
as motive power in interstate operation. The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court held that the gasoline on 
being unloaded and being stored ceased to be a 
subject of interstate commerce and lost its im-
munity as such from state taxation. The state tax 
was imposed on the withdrawal of the gasoline for 
use by the carrier." (Emphasis supplied) 
The Court added that the principles of the Union Stock 
Yards case \Yere reaffirmed in Edelman v. Bowing Air 
Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct 591, 77 L. Ed. 
1153 ( 1932), and it then said : 
"It is not contended that the hay, grain and straw, 
before being used by plaintiff in feeding the live-
stock in question had any interstate commerce 
status. We think it did not become a part of inter-
state commerce until after it \vas fed to the live-
stock. T'he tax was on the sale in this state and not 
on the use of these products in intersfa.te com-
merce.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
That even a use tax case may be distinguished on a 
"local event" theory is the holding of Southern Pacific 
;, v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389, 83 L. Ed. 586 
11 
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(1938), \vhere it was said that activities and events indis-
pensable to interstate commerce have been recognized by 
the Court as local privileges for tax purposes, even 
though the taxable moment is most brief. It was there 
held that the retention and installation of property are 
intrastate taxable events, and that there is a taxable 
moment when the property has reached the end of its in-
trastate haul and has not yet begun to be consumed in 
the interstate operation of the railroad. The Court there 
said, '' ... prohibited is state interference with commerce, 
a rna tter distinct from the expense of doing business.'' 
Although the tax herein is a sales or excise tax, an 
analogous problem has been considered in the area of 
gross receipt taxes. It has been held that using gross 
receipts to determine the value of a local activity or event 
for tax purposes is proper. This has been applied to a 
"ride variety of business activities, including manufactur-
ing, production and extraction of natural resources. These 
activities in themselves are not interstate commerce for 
tax purposes. See Utah Power & Light'· Pfost, 286 U. S. 
165, 52 S. Ct. 548, 76 I.J. Ed. 1038 (1932). The tax is 
considered as levied on a local actiYity distinct from 
interstate commerce and has been upheld in addi-
tion to an ad valorem tax. """-lnrcrican J.!fg. Co. 
v. St. Lou,is, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522, 63 L. Ed. 
1084 (1919). In Deparf1nent of Treasury '· Ingra1n-
Richa.rdsou JJlfg. Co., 313 U. S. 252, 61 S. Ct. 866, 85 
Il. Ed. 1313 ( 1940), a tax on enameling of stoYe parts in 
interstate commerce "Tas upheld, Yery closely analogous 
to the present case. 
12 
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However, in the present case the activity taxed is 
not an interstate commerce activity but is wholly intra-
state. It is conditioned upon local activity, that is, the 
repair of locomotives performed by petitioner entirely 
\Vi thin this state. This repair service is purchased by 
foreign railroads and is conditioned upon performance 
\\rithin this state. It is an activity which apart from its 
effect on commerce because of the very nature of the pur-
ehaser is subject to the state taxing power. The effect of 
the tax even though on services measured by interchange 
rules is neither to discriminate nor obstruct interstate 
commerce more than numerous state taxes which have re-
peatedly been sustained as involving no prohibitive regu-
lation of interstate commerce. See Aero Mayflower 
Tra;nsit Co. Y. Board of R. R. Commrs., 332 U. S. 495, 68 
S. Ct. 167, 92 L. Ed. 99 ( 194 7), where a gallonage tax 
imposed upon gasoline purchased within a state was ap-
plied to a wholly interstate carrier and was held to be not 
an unconstitutional burden. And in the case of McGold-
ri.ck v. Berwind White Coal Mining Co.,. 309 U. S. 33, 60 
S. Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 ( 1940), it was held: 
''Sales tax conditional on delivery of possession 
to purchaser within this state is based on local 
business activities, which apart from its effect on 
interstate commerce, is subject to the taxing power 
of the state, and hence such a tax does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. '' 
In this same case, it was held that the test is, does the tax 
have a tendency to prohibit the commerce or place it at a 
disadvantage as compared to intrastate commerce. 
13 
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PoiNT III 
THE FACT THAT RIO GRANDE IS PROHIBITED 
BY FEDERAL LAW FROM MOVING DEFECTIVE 
CARS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT A TAX UPON 
REP AIRS OF SUCH CARS BE DEEMED AN IL-
LEGAL INTERFERENCE WITH INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE. 
Petitioner contends that because of the federal law 
regulating the transporting of defective railroad cars and 
because of the fact that the nature of the repair as well 
as the amount charged therefor is regulated by the 
Association of American Railroads by its ''Interchange 
Rules," that the tax imposed is a direct interference 'vith 
congressional legislation now occupying the field for the 
regulation of commerce. This argument assumes that the 
tax imposed herein does interfere \vith commerce. If it 
does not constitute an illegal interference with interstate 
commerce, it does not matter that some aspects of rail-
road operation are regulated by the Federal government. 
There is no showing that the sales tax \vhich is the subject 
of this appeal interferes \vith duties imposed by the Fed-
eral government any more than does the use tax ''hich 
petitioner admits is a valid and proper exercise of the 
taxing power. As long as the tax is not imposed upon an 
agency of the Federal government, it matters not that the 
company sought to be taxed is regulated in other areas 
of its business life by the government. See .... 4laba n1,a Y. 
Ki,ng & Boozer, 314 U. S.1, 62 S. Ct. 43, 86 L. Ed. 3 (1941). 
Petitioner contends that because it is forbidden by 
Federal la"~ from operating defectiYe equipment that, 
therefore, it is impliedly required by the same la"T to 
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make repairs and perform services. Assuming the valid-
ity of this logic, it is next contended that the Tax 
Commission seeks to impose a tax burden upon the per-
formance of required duties, and that such a tax is a 
direct burden upon interstate commerce. 
The fallacy of this logic becomes apparent upon ex-
amination of its premises : 
1. A tax upon repair as a local incident is not neces-
sarily a tax on interstate commerce nor need it 
unduly burden such commerce. 
2. Purchases or sales in accordance with govern-
mental requirements or specifications are not 
exempt from state taxation unless the purchaser 
or seller partakes of the governmental immunity 
of the agency making the requirements. See Ala-
bama v. King & Boozer, supra,. 
Petitioner implies that the state of Utah is seeking 
to regulate the activities of railroads. Such is not the case. 
The Tax Commission only attempts to impose a tax upon 
a service transaction completed entirely within this state. 
In so doing, the Commission is complying with a valid 
grant of legislative authority. 
It is significant to note that the Utah Supreme Court 
has spoken concerning this particular matter. In the 
[Tnion Stock Yards case, supra, at page 179, the court 
said: 
''So here, the fact that plaintiff was licensed and 
under regulation of the Federal Government did 
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not convert it into an agency or instrumentality 
of the Government or confer immunity from the 
payment of the state sales tax on provender sold 
by it to be used in interstate commerce. We think 
it no different from any other sale by a local mer-
chant of articles to an interstate carrier, even 
though such articles are immediately attached to 
trains or buses for the purpose of engaging in or 
becoming a part of interstate transactions. The 
sale is complete within the state before the article 
commences its journey in interstate commerce.'-' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Petitioner cites several cases in support of its con-
tention, all of which are clearly distinguishable on their 
facts in that none of these cases deals with a sales or 
transaction tax as does the instant case. 
The most important of these cases is that of Joseph 
v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co. 330 U. S. 422, 67 S. 
Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed. 993 (1947). The decision in that case 
was reached after the Court professed to apply a multi-
ple burden or multiple taxation doctrine, and upon a fail-
ure to find stevedoring distinct enough from interstate 
commerce to permit the tax on a ''local event'' theory, 
the New York gross receipts tax was invalidated. 
This case is important because it illustrates the 
theory of the Commerce Clause and its relationship to 
taxation. Commerce is not to be subjected to the mul-
tiple burdens of taxation by the various states so as to 
place it at n competitive disadvantage 'Yith local business. 
l t cannot be stressed too greatly that in the case 
presPntly before this Court the incident of taxation, i.e., 
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servicing or repairing, clearly cannot be reached, tax-
\rise, by another state. The activity of repairing and 
furnishing service is confined exclusively to the state of 
Utah \rhich imposed the tax. No other state has juris-
diction to impose a tax on these services. The risk of 
multiple taxation does not exist in the present case. 
Local business in Utah, including servicing and re-
pair of planes, trucks, buses, etc., presumably must pay 
the sales tax involved herein. Therefore, interstate com-
merce would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage 
with local business by reason of the tax. In fact, the 
effect of petitioner's claimed exemption gives to inter-
state commerce a large tax immunity as compared with 
the tax burden on local business. To grant petitioner's 
claim will be to not equalize the tax burden as between 
interstate and local business but to give interstate busi-
ness a competitive advantage. Such would be to grant a 
discriminating preference to this interstate business -
a result which it is exceedingly difficult to believe the 
Commerce Clause ever was intended to achieve. 
CONCLUSION 
The trend in recent years has been away from a strict 
construction of the Commerce Clause. As late as 1939, a 
preponderence of government activities were deemed 
exempt from sales or use tax for varying reasons. The 
Commerce Clause had been an oasis of exemption, and 
probably the most prolific source of exemptions has 
been the area of interstate commerce. Up until the early 
1930's it was very strictly construed. Beginning with 
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the case of Western Livestock v. Bureau, 303 U. S. 250, 
58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. Ed. 823 (1938) where the court said, 
''Even interstate commerce must pay its way,'' a gradual 
lessening of this construction has been noted. Recent pro-
nouncements by the Court evidence no change from the 
pervading liberal interpretation. Scripto, Inc., v. Carson, 
______ U. S. ______ ,80S. Ct. ______ , 4 L. Ed. 2d 660, Decided March 
21, 1960. 
In summary, it is the position of the Commission that 
the repairs made by the Rio Grande to cars, locomotives 
and other rolling stock of foreign lines are a local business 
activity, the incidence of which is before the beginning 
of interstate commerce, as applied to the article or the 
service which is taxed. That the Utah sales tax is a tax 
upon a transaction, and the transaction in the present case 
was completed before it became part of interstate com-
merce. That the cases cited by petitioner are clearly 
distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. It is 
respectfully submitted, therefore, that the taxation of 
such repairs is not forbidden by the Commerce Clause 
but should properly be upheld against petitioner. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General 
F. BURTON HOWARD, 
Assistant Attorney Gen,eral 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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